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THE APPLICABILITY OF ANTITRUST LAWS
TO PRICE SQUEEZES IN THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the
Commission)' is empowered to approve rates charged for electric
power sold at wholesale in interstate commerce. 2 State agencies, on
the other hand, regulate the prices that utilities can charge for intrastate sales at retail.3 A consequence of this dual regulation is the
possibility that wholesale rates may exceed retail rates.4 Since
municipally-owned electric utilities usually do not have their own
generating facilities, they must buy power at wholesale from
investor-owned utilities.5 Although municipal electric utilities generally are not constrained by the state-established retail prices,6 the
two-tiered price system affects the municipal utilities because the
investor-owned utilities also provide retail services and therefore
I The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission succeeded the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) when that organization became defunct on October 1, 1977. Department of Energy
Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977); Exec. Order No. 12,009, 42 Fed.
Reg. 46,267 (1977). This Note will refer to the agency either as the "Commission" or the
"FERC."
2 Federal Power Act, §§ 201-209, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824h (1976) (amended 1978). Section
201 of the Federal Power Act outlines the basic jurisdiction of the FERC and provides in
pertinent part:
The provisions of [sections 824-824h] shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in
interstate commerce, but shall not apply to any other sale of electric energy ...
The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or
sale of electric energy ...
Id. at 824(b); see FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964); Foster, Garfield &
Herz, FPCRegulationof Sales of Electric Energy at Wholesale, 51 VA. L. REy. 76 (1965); notes
21-29 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 132-137 and accompanying text infra.
I FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 272-73 (1976); City of Mishawaka v. Indiana &
Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978); City
of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 765-66 (D. Del. 1979); City of
Shakopee v. Northern States Power Co., No. 4-75-591, slip op. at 2 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 1976).
5 Meeks, Concentrationin the ElectricPower Industry: The Impact of AntitrustPolicy,
72 CoLuMa. L. REV. 64, 67-69 (1972).
' COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES AND ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION 26-27
(1977) [hereinafter cited as STATE GOVERNMENTS' REPORT]; FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,
FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION OF ELECTRIC, GAS AND TELEPHONE UTILITIES 5-6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 FPC REGULATORY SURVEY]. Only twenty
commissions are vested with the power to regulate municipally-owned utilities. STATE
GOVERNMENTS' REPORT, supra, at 26-27.
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compete with the municipalities.7 When the wholesale rates paid by
a municipal company are higher than the retail prices that private
utilities charge, a "price squeeze" occurs, placing the municipal
utility at a competitive disadvantage . Since neither the state nor
federal regulatory agencies have afforded an adequate solution to
this problem, several municipal utilities have sought redress under
the federal antitrust laws.'
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every person" 10 from
"monopoliz[ing], or attempt[ing] to monopolize, or combin[ing]
or conspir[ing] with any other person . . . to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States. . . ..
" Despite
the breadth ascribed to "persons," certain regulated industries and
professions have been exempted from compliance with the antitrust
laws pursuant to judicially created' 2 or express statutory grants of
immunity.' 3 In the electric utility industry, no express statutory
7 Fairman & Scott, Transmission, Power Pools, and Competition in the Electric Utility
Industry, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1161-62 & n.15 (1977).
1 See cases cited in note 4 supra.In addition to "price squeezes," poor management, line
losses in excess of those typically experienced in the industry, and outdated equipment also
may explain why municipal systems cannot compete effectively with the larger, more efficient
investor-owned systems. See generally, Fairman & Scott, supra note 7, at 1163 n.19.
I City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978); City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp.
763 (D. Del. 1979); City of Shakopee v. Northern States Power Co., No. 4-75-591 (D.Minn.
Oct. 18, 1976).
As of 1973, municipally-owned power companies were operating in 44 states. 1973 FPC
REGULATORY SURVEY, supra note 6, at 2. The total number of municipally-owned electric
utilities in the United States in 1975 was 2,224. PUB. POWER Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 36. Recently,
however, the number of municipal systems being taken over by investor-owned utilities has
exceeded the number being formed. From 1960 to 1969, 72 municipal systems were purchased
by investor-owned companies while only 23 new systems were formed. Fairman & Scott, supra
note 7, at 1163 n.20.
10Section 8 of the Sherman Act defines "person" to include corporations and associations. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). The courts have further construed "person" to embrace municipalities, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), foreign
governments, Pfizer v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), partnerships, Western
Laundry & Linen Rental Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
849 (1970), labor unions, United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922),
and individual corporate officers and directors, United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
1115 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
92 E.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (legal profession); Gordon v. New York
Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1974) (stockbroker commissions set by the SEC); Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (aviation industry); Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943) (state agricultural proration program); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260
U.S. 156 (1922) (interstate carrier rates).
13Statutory exemptions stem from two sources. Some are contained in the antitrust laws
themselves. E.g., Robinson-Patman Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1976); Clayton Act, §§ 6, 7,
15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 18 (1976). Other exemptions can be found in trade regulation statutes. E.g.,
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immunity exists and it has been clear since the Supreme Court
decided Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States14 that some anticompetitive activities may give rise to antitrust liability despite the
highly regulated nature of the industry." Whether the existence of
a "price squeeze" gives rise to liability or even establishes a prima
facie violation of the antitrust laws, however, is currently an open
question.
This Note briefly describes the rate-making functions of the
federal and state regulatory agencies in the electric utility industry
and the price squeezes that occur as a result of the gap inherent in
the dual regulatory system." Two recent attempts by municipal
utilities caught in price squeezes to seek redress under the antitrust
laws and the issues raised by the defendants-the doctrines of exclusive jurisdiction, primary jurisdiction, and state action immunity-are then examined."7 In discussing these doctrines, the Note
comments upon their apparent inapplicability to the utility price
squeeze antitrust action.' 8 The Note then analyzes two key issues
which arise in establishing that a price squeeze is a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act: whether the allegation of a mere
disparity between wholesale and retail rates is sufficient to state a
cause of action and whether federal antitrust remedies are applicable to such price squeeze situations. 9 Finally, recent legislative proposals which could obviate the necessity of antitrust litigation are
20
explored.
Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, § 5, 7 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976); Commodity Exchange
Act, § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1976); McCarran Ferguson Act, §§ 1-5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976);
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 408,409, 412,414,49 U.S.C. §§ 1378,1379, 1382, 1384 (1976);
Interstate Commerce Act, § 5(11), 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1976). In contrast, certain regulatory
statutes specifically provide that the antitrust laws will remain applicable. E.g., Automobile

Dealers Franchise Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 1224 (1976); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 105, 42
U.S.C. § 2135 (1976). For a discussion of statutory exemptions, see P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST
ANALysis (2d ed. 1974); 7 J. VON KAInrowsKu, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION

§ 44.02

(1978); McGovern, Antitrust Exemptions for Regulated Industries, 20 FED. B.J. 10 (1960),
reprinted in 3 M. HOFFMANN & A. WINARD, HOFMsNN'S ANTrraUST LAW AND TECHNIQUES 465
(1963).
" 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
Id. at 374-75.
" See notes 21-63 and accompanying text infra.
' See notes 65-90 and accompanying text infra.
IS See notes 91-159 and accompanying text infra.
' See notes 160-176 and accompanying text infra.

See notes 177-183 and accompanying text infra.
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vs. THE STATE REGULATORY AGENCIES-THE PRICE SQUEEZE

The standard employed by both the federal and state agencies
in approving retail and wholesale electric utility rates is one of reasonableness. Price squeezes do not necessarily represent the product
of arbitrary or unreasonable rate-approval practices on either the
state or federal level. Rather, the price squeeze constitutes the
"synergistic" effect born in certain geographic areas from the interaction of the state-approved retail rate and the federally-approved
wholesale rate.
The FERC
Congress, having declared that the sale and transmission of
electricity affects the public interest,'2 delegated to the FERC the
power to regulate rates charged for electric power sold at wholesale
in interstate commerce .22 The Federal Power Act (the Act) provides
that the rates must be just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory and that utilities may not charge other than the filed rates. 3
If rates are found to be unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory, the FERC may determine and set just rates.24 Although
Act requires electric utilities to file current rates with the Commission, approval is not necessary.2 The FERC may delay the effective
21 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1976) (amended 1978).

Id. § 824(b). The Supreme Court's decision in FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376
U.S. 205 (1964), greatly expanded the scope of the Commission's regulation of electric power
sold at wholesale. Rejecting the view that the Commission's jurisdiction should be determined
on a case-by-case basis, the Court stated that the Federal Power Act gave the Commission
jurisdiction over "all wholesale sales in interstate commerce except those which Congress has
made explicitly subject to regulation by the States." Id. at 216.
Subject to its jurisdictional limits, the FERC is authorized, inter alia, to order the
interconnection of generating facilities, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1976), as amended by Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3142 and the wheeling
of power to preserve competition, 16 U.S.C. § 211 (1976), although it was not so authorized
prior to 1978. See id. §§ 824-824h. For an overview of the FERC's authority in regulating
electric utilities, see 7 J. VON KALiNowsKI, supra note 13, § 44A.08(2).
" 16 U.S.C. § 824d (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility
for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining
to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge
that is not . . . is hereby declared to be unlawful.
(b) No public utility shall . . . (1) . . . subject any person to any undue
prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates. ..
either as between localities or as between classes of service.
24 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1976).
Maine Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 579 F.2d 659, 663 (1st Cir. 1978).
2
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date of new rates for up to seven months to determine their lawfulness, 26 but once the period has expired, the rates automatically
become effective regardless of whether the Commission has completed hearings on the matter. If the suspension period expires with
no determination made, the rates are subject to refund should the
Commission conclude that such rates are unlawful. 21 Once the Commission approves the rates, however, it does not have power to invalidate the rates retroactively or award reparations if the rates are
29
later found to be unreasonable.
The rate-making process is complicated and time consuming.30
21 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1976), as amended by Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617 §§ 207(a), 208, 92 Stat. 3142. Section 205(d) of the Act requires that
a utility wishing to change a rate schedule give 60 days notice to the Commission and the
public prior to the time it is to go into effect. Id. At any time before the effective date, the
Commission may order an investigation to examine the lawfulness of the proposed rates either
upon receipt of a complaint or upon its own initiative, and suspend the effectiveness of the
proposed rates up to 5 months from the date they should have gone into effect. 16 U.S.C. §
824d(e) (1976). In ordering a rate hearing, the FERC must give reasonable notice to the
filing utility and state its reasons for the suspension. The burden is on the filing utility to
show that the proposed rates are reasonable, just and not unduly discriminatory. Id.
2 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976).
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 618 (1944).
2 Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 258 (1951);
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 618 (1944).
The rate-making process involves the resolution of four factors. First, the company's
gross utility revenues must be determined. I A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION 45 (1969). Second, an estimate of the operating expenses incurred in accumulating gross revenues must be made. Id. Operating costs are then subtracted from the gross
revenue to arrive at a figure for the utility's capital costs. Id.; see STATE GOVERNMENTS'
REPoRT, supra note 6, at 25. Third, the property providing the service for which rates are
charged, such as transformers and power generation facilities, must be valued since it represents the rate base. 1 A. PRIEST, supra, at 46. Two methods are used to determine a utility's
rate base: the original cost method used by the FERC and a majority of state commissions,
see 1973 FPC REGULATORY SURVEY, supra note 6, at 50, which uses the figure from the utility's
accounts, 1 A. PRIEST, supra, at 46, and the fair value method which uses factors such as
replacement costs, id. Finally, the rate of return must be determined so that the return to
which investors are entitled may be established. Id.
The Supreme Court has held that rates must be established which will be
"commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks."
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). After these four factors have been
resolved, a rate schedule is devised that will give the company an opportunity to earn its
revenue requirements. 1 A. PRIEST, supra, at 46. As a result of the adoption of a particular
rate schedule, different classes of customers are charged different rates. Such differential
pricing is lawful. P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 136 (1964) (citing G.
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 223 (1947)). Electric utilities typically have five major customer classes. They are: wholesale, residential, industrial, commercial, and institutional.
STATE GOVERNIENTS' REPORT, supranote 6, at 49. Within the various classes, rates will differ
depending on the level of kilowatt consumption. Id.
It is generally agreed that a utility's rate structure should approximate the cost of providing the service. Id. A utility's costs are usually grouped into three categories. First, there are
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In the three to four years that often elapse from the time a rate is
filed until it is approved," power companies have frequently filed
for subsequent rate increases which have gone into effect subject to
refund.32 It is this "pancaking" of rates, compounded by the long
delays in the rate approval process, which leads to the creation of a
price squeeze.3
The State Regulatory Agency
While regulatory commissions have been established by all fifty
states and the District of Columbia to oversee the operation of public utilities, 34 their powers vary.35 A common purpose among the
customer costs which include "accounting, billing, metering . ..service connections and
certain advertising and distribution" costs. Id. Next, there are operation of energy costs which
include "fuel, labor, materials, and maintenance." Id. The third category is demand costs
which cover the cost of "generation, transmission, and distribution plant (reflected by depreciation), allowed rate of return on rate base, property taxes, and interest charges on long-term
debt." Id. After a utility's costs have been determined, they are apportioned among the
various classes of customers. Id. For a discussion of rate structures and design, see ESSAYS ON
PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND REGULATION (H. Trebling ed. 1971); Huntington, The Rapid

Emergence of MarginalCost Pricingin the Regulation of Electric Utility Rate Structures, 55
B.U.L. REV. 689 (1975); Rate Design For Electric Corporations, 15 Pus. UwIL. REP. 4th 434
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Note, Lexonomics and the Electrical Utility Industry: In
Search of the Optimal Rate Structure, 61 IOWA L. REV. 134 (1975); 1978 ANN. SuRv. AM. L.

559.

'IIn City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), the
wholesale rate in question was filed with the Commission in June 1972, and final resolution
occurred five years later. Id. at 1324.
32 Radin, Outlooks and Insights, Improving FPC Regulation, 1976 Pus. POWER 8-9.
3 Id.; AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, ELECTRmC UwrurY

1, 16 (1977).
STATE GOVERNMENTS' REPORT, supra note 6, at 17. State regulatory commissions were
created in an attempt to remedy the failure of state legislatures and courts to control and
oversee the large utility companies. Id. at 16-17. State regulatory structures are typified by
RATE REFORM
"

the Delaware scheme.
The Delaware legislation provides:
No public utility shall make, impose or exact any unjust or unreasonable or
unduly preferential or unjustly discriminatory individual or joint rate for any product or service supplied or rendered by it within the State, or adopt, maintain or
enforce any regulation, practice or measurement which is unjust, unreasonable,

unduly preferential or unjustly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of law, or
make, or give, directly or indirectly, any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person or corporation or to any particular description of traffic, in
any respect whatsoever.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 303 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
To enforce this mandate, Delaware created a public service commission (PSC) consisting
of five members. Id. § 103(a). The PSC has "exclusive original supervision and regulation of
all public utilities and also over their rates. . . ." Id. § 201. The regulation of municipallyowned utilities, however, is not within the jurisdiction of the PSC. Id. § 202. The commission
has the power to require public utilities "to file with the Commission complete schedules of
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state commissions, however, is "to secure the benefits of a natural
monopoly but to prevent most of the inherent abuses."36 Thus, like
the Federal Power Act, most states forbid the maintenance of rates
which are unduly or unreasonably discriminatory.3 7 To ensure that
the retail rates within their respective jurisdictions are not unreasonable or unduly discriminatory, most state commissions can require prior authorization of rate changes, suspend the effectiveness
of proposed rates, investigate the lawfulness of rates, and prescribe
38
temporary rates pending the outcome of investigations.
The vast majority of state commissions regulate not only
investor-owned electric utilities but gas and telephone utilities as
well. 9 In addition, almost half of the commissions perform other
duties 0 which, compounded by the complexity and time consumed
in determining the reasonableness of rates, contribute to the delays
encountered in receiving approval of retail rate schedules.' To
every classification employed and of every individual or joint rate, fare, or charge made,
charged or executed by the public utility. . . ." Id. § 301. A utility wishing to change its rate
must give the PSC 60 days notice. Id. § 304. The PSC may suspend the effectiveness of the
rate change for up to seven months, id. § 306, in order to investigate the lawfulness of the
proposed rate, id. § 305. The commission may investigate a rate change on its own initiative
or upon complaint, id., and hold joint hearings with any state or federal commission, id. §
214. The burden of proving that the proposed rates are just is upon the filing utility. Id. §
307. If the PSC finds "any existing or proposed rate unjust, unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory, or in any wise in violation of law" it is empowered to set a just rate to be charged
thereafter. Id. § 311.
" For a discussion of the various state statutes, see 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 286.
STATE GOVERNMENTS' REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
1 A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 285-289. For examples of these laws, see CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE § 453 (Deering 1970); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 159, § 14 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:2-21(b) (West 1969); N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAw §§ 72, 97 (McKinney 1978);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4909.28 (Baldwin 1978).
1973 FPC REGULATORY SURVEY, supra note 6, at 7-8.
Id. at 3-8. Forty-six states vest their commissions with the power to regulate electric,
gas and telephone utilities. Id. Although all the state commissions are empowered to regulate
retail rates charged by investor-owned power companies, most have no authority to regulate
rates charged by municipally-owned systems, and even among those that do, the extent of
such regulation varies. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
111973 FPC REGULATORY SURVEY, supra note 6, at 124. Commission duties include regulation of insurance companies, collection of taxes on motor vehicles, and enforcement of "Blue
Sky" laws. Id.
'I Delays encountered in receiving approval of rates by a state commission might be
alleviated if proposals similar to one recently presented to the New York Senate were put into
effect. See N.Y.S. 1245, 201st Sess. (1978). This bill would prohibit the Public Service Commission from granting an increase to any electric or gas utility which has received an increase
in the preceding 24 months, thereby reducing the number of rate filings. Temporary rate relief
could be granted, however, if extraordinary conditions existed. Id. This proposal, however,
could easily create or perpetuate price squeezes. If a utility is prohibited from seeking a retail
rate increase but is permitted to "pancake" wholesale rate filings, the likelihood is increased
that wholesale rates at some point will exceed retail rates.
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counter these delays, some state commissions routinely halve rate
increases requested by utilities, thereby creating or exacerbating a
disparity between retail and wholesale rates.4 2 Additionally, since
most state commissions, in contrast to the FERC, are not authorized to permit proposed retail rates to be collected subject to refund,4 3 pancaking of retail rates is unlikely. Thus, while the
investor-owned utility "pancakes" its wholesale rates, its retail
rates may increase more slowly.
Federal Power Commission v. Conway-An Illustrationof the Price
Squeeze
Until the Supreme Court's decision in FederalPower Commission v. Conway,4 4 it was not clear that the FERC was empowered
to consider whether a utility's wholesale rates were discriminatory
and noncompetitive when compared with a utility's nonjurisdictional retail rates. In Conway, defendant Arkansas Power & Light
Co. filed a wholesale rate increase with the Commission. Several
of the company's municipal wholesale customers in competition
with the defendant at the retail level sought to intervene in the
rate proceeding,45 arguing that the increase should be denied
because, inter alia, it "was 'an attempt to squeeze [the municipal
utilities] . . .out of competition and to make them more susceptible to the persistent attempts of the company to take over the
public[ly] owned systems in the State.' ,,u Noting that its jurisdiction covered only wholesale rates, the Commission allowed intervention but refused to consider the price squeeze allegation because
its statutory jurisdictional grant would be exceeded.47 The Commission reasoned that any anti-competitive effect of the price
squeeze would be the result of the retail rate set by the state commission, since a determination that a wholesale rate is just and
reasonable precludes any anticompetitive consequences." Rejecting
the Commission's argument, the Supreme Court held that the
412
If a utility files a retail rate that is in parity with its wholesale rate but the retail rate
is automatically reduced, a price squeeze may be created through no fault of the filing utility.
See City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 771 (D.Del. 1979).
" 1973 FPC REGULATORY SuRvEy, supra note 6, at 7-9.
426 U.S. 271 (1976).
" Id. at 274.
" Id. (quoting appellants' brief at 6). The plaintiffs asserted that the proposed rates were
"plainly discriminatory" and would make it impossible for them to offer electric power at a
competitive price. Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 277-78.
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agency must consider allegations of a price squeeze in setting wholesale rates. 9 The Court stated that although the wholesale and retail
rates may be reasonable when considered separately, their relationship may produce a discriminatory effect." Since the discrimination
can be traced to a rate within the Commission's jurisdiction, it was
determined that the wholesale rates must be set within the "lower
range of the zone of reasonableness" to comply with the Act.5 '
The Position of the FERC
Consistent with the Conway decision, a recently promulgated
FERC procedure allows "[a ny wholesale customer, state commissioner or other interested person" to "file petitions to intervene
alleging price discrimination and anticompetitive effects of the
wholesale rates. 5 2 Regardless of who intervenes, the investigation
11Id. at 278. In rejecting the FERC's argument, the Court quoted a previous statement
of the Commission:
It occurs to us that one rate in its relation to another rate may be discriminatory, although each rate per se, if considered independently, might fall within the
zone of reasonableness. There is considerable latitude within the zone of reasonableness insofar as the level of a particular rate is concerned. The relationship of
rates within such a zone, however, may result in an undue advantage in favor of
one rate and be discriminatory insofar as another rate is concerned. When such a
situation exists, the discrimination found to exist must be removed.
Id. (quoting Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 134, 149 (1940)).
426 U.S. at 279.
" Id. The Court quoted from Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973), wherein
it was noted that among other powers granted to the Commission by the Federal Power Act
was "'the responsibility to consider, in appropriate circumstances, the anticompetitive
effects of regulated aspects of interstate utility operations pursuant to . . .directives contained in §§ 205, 206. . . .'" 426 U.S. at 279 (quoting 411 U.S. at 758-59). The Conway Court
further construed § 206(a), see note 23 supra. to mean that "Ithe rules, practices, or
contracts 'affecting' the jurisdictional rate are not themselves limited to the jurisdictional
context." 426 U.S. at 281.
52 18 C.F.R. § 2.17(a)(1978). An intervenor's prima facie price squeeze case includes: 1)
specification of the retail rate with which the intervenor is unable to compete; 2) proof of
competition at retail between the intervenor and the filing utility; 3) proof that the proposed
wholesale rates are higher than the present retail rates; 4) the intervenor's comparable retail
rate; 5) the reduction in the wholesale rate necessary to remedy the price squeeze. Id.
As of June 1976, 49 price squeeze cases were pending before the FERC. Fairman & Scott,
supra note 7, at 1173 n.55 (citing Hearings on H.R. 15544, Emergency Federal PowerAct,
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (statement of Rep. McFall)). Between November
1978 and April 1979 over a dozen price squeeze investigations have been ordered by the FERC.
See, e.g., Boston Edison Co., FERC DOCKET No. ER 79-216 (Apr. 24, 1979), reprinted in 17
Fed. Power Serv. 5-634; Commonwealth Edison Co., FERC DocKET No. ER 79-182 (March
30, 1979), reprinted in 17 Fed. Power Serv. 5-442; Kansas City Power & Light Co., FERC
DOCKET No. ER 79-166 (March 28, 1979), reprinted in 17 Fed. Power Serv. 5-404; Detroit
Edison Co., FERC DOCKET No. ER 79-70 (March 9, 1979), reprinted in 17 Fed. Power Serv.
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procedures provide for the participation of the state agency responsible for regulating the retail rates in issue.5 3 In addition, the wholesaler has the burden of disproving the existence of a price squeeze. "
In Missouri Power & Light Co., " the FERC recently sought to
clarify the weight to be accorded allegations of a rate disparity and
the consequent effects in deciding whether proposed wholesale rates
are unlawful. " In dicta,5 7 the Commission stated that although
Conway directed it to consider price squeeze allegations in setting
rates, the mere existence of a price squeeze does not render the
proposed wholesale rates unlawful.58 It was asserted that the public
interest, among other considerations,59 might render the rates not
unduly discriminatory and hence lawful under the Act.10 While conceding that it must take into account "the fundamental national
policy expressed in the antitrust laws,"'" the Commission noted that
the enforcement of procompetitive policies "cannot become [our]
paramount goal." 6 Thus, an evaluation of the "public interest"
5-220; Metropolitan Edison Co., FERC DOCKET No. ER 79-58 (Jan. 12, 1979), reprinted in
16 Fed. Power Serv. 5-774; Potomac Edison Co., FERC DOCKET No. ER 78-460 (Nov. 22,
1978), reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. 5-467; Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., FERC DocKEr
No. ER 78-509 (Nov. 22, 1978), reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. 5-482.
-" 18 C.F.R. § 2.17(f) (1978). By allowing participation by state commissions, the price
squeeze procedure sets the stage for cooperation and coordination between the federal and
state agencies.
, Id. § 2.17(e).
' FERC DOCKET No. ER 76-539 (Oct. 27, 1978), reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. 5-265.
Power Serv. 5-265.
" Id. In Missouri Power & Light Co., the Commission stated that intent to engage in
discrimination is irrelevant in determining whether a price squeeze exists and "whether a
price discrimination constitutes an undue discrimination under the Federal Power Act." Id.,
reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. at 5-272.
11An intervenor had alleged that Missouri Power & Light's retail rates would create a
price squeeze. Id., reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. at 5-270. The retail rates were increased
during the pendency of the proceeding before the FERC, thus creating a parity between the
wholesale and retail rates. Id., reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. at 5-271. Nevertheless, the
FERC proceeded to amplify its position on certain factors concerning price squeeze allegations. Id.
58Id., reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. at 5-273. Although a mere disparity in rates is
not unlawful, the Commission stated that the existence of a price squeeze will create a
presumption that the rates are unlawful and in violation of the Federal Power Act, "unless
countervailing public policy or factual circumstances are of a nature that would cause the
Commission to conclude that the discrimination is not undue." Id., reprinted in 16 Fed.
Power Serv. at 5-273 n.18.
19 Other factors which the FERC felt should be taken into account are "adequacy of
service, reliability, [and] financial integrity." Id., reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. at 5-274.
,1 Id., reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. at 5-273.
6, Id. (quoting Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 759-60 (1973)); accord, Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
," FERC DOCKET No. ER 76-539 (Oct. 27, 1978), reprinted in 16 Fed. Power Serv. at 5-
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sometimes may outweigh any anticompetitive consequences
result63
ing from approval of the proposed wholesale rates.

Delmarva AND Mishawaka: DIFFERING

APPROACHES

Although Conway mandates that the FERC must consider
price squeeze allegations, the Commission's position enunciated in
MissouriPower & Light has not resolved the price squeeze dilemma.
The Commission's apparent willingness to tolerate price squeezes as
long as wholesale rates are not "unduly" discriminatory could
have a devastating effect upon municipally-owned electric utilities.
Absent an antitrust remedy, some municipal systems are likely to
face competitive disadvantages sufficiently severe that they may be
taken over by investor-owned utilities.64
Recently, in City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co.65
and City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.,'60 municipal utilities caught in price squeezes sought redress under the
antitrust laws against investor-owned electric utilities, alleging that
the maintenance of a price squeeze violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. 7 The defendants interposed the administrative law prin273; see Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
FERC DocKET No. ER 76-539 (Opinion No. 31, Oct. 27, 1978), reprinted in 16 Fed.
Power Serv. at 5-274.
6, City of Shakopee v. Northern States Power Co., No. 4-75-591 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 1976).
The Shakopee plaintiffs alleged that "new industry will not locate in Shakopee if it must pay
a higher power rate" and "existing industrial customers are pressuring Shakopee not to
expand its service area and to get out of the power business altogether." Id., slip op. at 2.
467 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1979).
560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978), on remand sub nom.
City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
There was an earlier case in which an investor-owned utility, charged with maintaining
a price squeeze, claimed it was immune from liability for violations of the antitrust laws. See
City of Shakopee v. Northern States Power Co., No. 4-75-591 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 1976). The
court concluded that no such immunity existed. Id., slip op. at 8.
" Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1317; Delmarva, 467 F. Supp. at 765. The plaintiffs sued under
the Clayton Act which authorizes private parties to initiate actions seeking treble damages,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), and injunctive relief, id. § 26, for violations of the Sherman Act. Section
2 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States .
shall be deemed guilty of a felony . ..
Id. § 2.
The Delmarva plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant's activities constituted unreasonable restraints on trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, id. § 1, by preventing the
plaintiffs from selling power to any of Delmarva's retail customers, by precluding the construction of transmission facilities, and by refusing to transmit power. 467 F. Supp. at 766.
In addition to alleging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the Delmarva plaintiffs
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ciples of exclusive and primary jurisdiction and the judiciallycreated state action exemption doctrine." Basically, the doctrine of
exclusive jurisdiction provides immunity from the antitrust laws for
industries governed by a complete and pervasive federal regulatory
scheme, provided certain criteria are fulfilled.69 In contrast, the primary jurisdiction doctrine, while not shielding conduct from antitrust proscriptions, mandates a stay in a judicial proceeding until
the appropriate administrative agency has passed upon the issues
within its jurisdiction. Two requirements have to be met before the
doctrine applies: the agency's determination must serve the interest
of uniformity, 7° and the agency's expertise must be valuable to the
court in reaching a decision. 7' The third assertion, the state action
exemption doctrine, protects conduct otherwise violative of the an72
titrust laws if undertaken pursuant to state directive.
The Mishawaka and Delmarva courts reached different results
as to the applicability of exclusive jurisdiction and the state action
exemption, apparently because of the distinguishable conceptual
approaches used to analyze the issues. The Mishawaka court, finding that the defendant could be held liable for damages and injunctive relief, viewed the price squeeze problem as one which could not
be remedied under the federal or state regulatory systems.73 Accordunsuccessfully urged that the maintenance of a price squeeze was violative of the R5obinsonPatman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). 467 F. Supp. at 772-74. For a discussion of the
Robinson-Patman issue, see note 162 infra.
" Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1318-24; Delmarva, 467 F. Supp. at 768-71. Delmarva first
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1),
claiming that it was immune from liability for antitrust violations. 467 F. Supp. at 765-67.
The Mishawaka defendants moved to dismiss on two alternative grounds: lack of subject
matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 560 F.2d at
1317. In the event these motions were denied, a stay was requested until the FERC concluded
its hearings on the matter. Id.; 467 F. Supp. at 766.
" See notes 94-100 and accompanying text infra.
70 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 439-40 (1907); see notes 125130 and accompanying text infra.
71 Great N. Ry. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922); see notes 130-131
and accompanying text infra.
72 See notes 137-159 and accompanying text infra.
7' 560 F.2d at 1319. On remand, the district court entered a judgment against the
Mishawaka defendants for violating § 2 of the Sherman Act. City of Mishawaka v. American
Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1334 (N.D. Ind. 1979). The defendants were enjoined from
initiating wholesale rates in excess of retail rates, and the plaintiffs were awarded damages
totalling over 12 million dollars after trebling. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power
Co., [1979-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) $ 62,447, at 76,654-55.
Since the defendants supplied 89% of the retail electricity in their areas and 95-100% of
the power purchased at wholesale by the plaintiffs, the court found that the defendants
possessed monopoly power over the sale of electric power at wholesale and retail in their
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ingly, the court found that the FERC did not possess exclusive
jurisdiction.74 Similarly, the state action exemption was inapplicageographic service areas. 465 F. Supp. at 1325-26. Having also found that the defendants and
plaintiffs competed at retail for the business of residential and industrial customers, the court
concluded that the defendants had utilized their monopoly power to engage "in anticompetitive and exclusionary acts and practices having the purpose and effect of preserving and
expanding. . . [an] existing monopoly in retail sales. . . ." Id. at 1326-28. The court stated
that the defendants had been charging wholesale rates that, in effect, were unregulated due
to their pancaking of rate filings with the FERC. These rates were found to be unreasonable
by the court and hence in violation of the Federal Power Act because of the defendants' failure
to attempt to achieve parity between their wholesale and retail rates. Id. at 1328. The court
also noted that the anticompetitive effects of the defendants' rate structures were compounded by other practices engaged in by the defendants, such as expressions of their intent
to discontinue sales at wholesale and attempts to impose contract provisions which would
place the plaintiffs at an unacceptable competitive disadvantage. Id. at 1328-29.
The district court also concluded that when a defendant is found to possess monopoly
power, only a general intent to monopolize need be shown and proof that the defendant
engaged in predatory conduct is not required. Id. at 1329-32 (citations omitted). The
Mishawaka defendants' general intent to monopolize had been shown by their failure to
maintain a parity between their wholesale and retail rates. Id. at 1332-34. Assuming a specific
intent to monopolize was necessary, it was found that this could be inferred from the defendants' maintenance of a price squeeze and attempts to discontinue their wholesale business
to the plaintiffs. Id. at 1334-37.
The Mishawaka court rejected the defendants' contention that their conduct was immune from the operation of the antitrust laws under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. Id. at
1337. In brief, Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), established that efforts
by private individuals to influence legislative and regulatory activity are not in violation of
the antitrust laws despite anticompetitive motives. The Mishawaka court stated:
[N]othing in the Noerr opinion implies that the mere fact that a state regulatory
agency may approve a proposal included in a tariff, and thereby require that the
proposal be implemented until a revised tariff is filed and approved, is a sufficient
reason for conferring antitrust immunity on the proposed conduct.
465 F. Supp. at 1337 (quoting Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 601-02 (1976)). For
a discussion of Mishawaka on remand, see 12 INn. L. Rav. 637 (1979).
11560 F.2d at 1318-21 (citing FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976)); see notes 96100 and accompanying text infra. The Mishawaka court opined that nothing in the Conway
decision intimates that the FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over a price squeeze allegation.
560 F.2d at 1319. Moreover, the court stated that if the retail rates were set so low that the
FERC would have to set the wholesale rates at a confiscatory level, the situation would be
remediless since the FERC must set rates that are just and reasonable to the power company
and its customers. Id.
The Mishawaka court also relied on Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973), and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).Analogizing to Cantor, the
Mishawaka court held that it would not be unfair to subject the defendants to liability for
conduct required by the sovereign since the defendants could have avoided the disparity in
rates. 560 F.2d at 1320-21. In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted with approval the
interpretation accorded Cantor by the court in City of Shakopee v. Northern States Power
Co., No. 4-75-591 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 1976). The Slakopee court expressed the reasoning of
Cantor as follows:
[I]f an anticompetitive practice is the product, at least in part, of the company being regulated, ind could be avoided if the company chose to do so, then
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ble because the antitrust laws would not conflict with a regulation
by a state
which did not have jurisdiction to remedy the price
75
squeeze .

In contrast to the Mishawaka court, which looked at the interrelationship of the federal and state structures, the Delmarva court
appeared to view the regulatory systems independently. The court
minimized the importance of Mishawaka'srecognition that an antitrust remedy for price squeezes would fill the gap created by the
inability of either the FERC or state regulatory bodies acting alone
to eliminate the anticompetitive effect inherent in a disparity
between retail and wholesale rates. 7 Rather, it found that the relevant inquiry should be "whether the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction or the granting of a particular form of antitrust relief" would
conflict with regulation by the FERC and state commissions."
Thus, when the court addressed the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine,
it found that since Congress had empowered the FERC to set wholesale rates consistent with the public interest, the FERC's determination precluded the existence of anticompetitive situations. 78 As
additional support, the Delmarva court relied on the Supreme
Court's holding that no one can claim to be entitled to an electric
power rate other than the one on file with the Commission and "not
even a court can authorize commerce in the commodity on other
terms."79 The court concluded that granting damages would be inconsistent with the rates sanctioned by the FERC, 0 although inthe anticompetitive condition is in reality the work of that company and is not
"necessary" to the functioning of the regulatory scheme and will not be immunized
from antitrust liability.
Id., slip op. at 6, quoted in 560 F.2d at 1320.
Finally, Mishawaka followed the reasoning of the Shakopee court in holding that no
conflict existed between the application of the antitrust laws and regulation of rates by the
FERC, because it is the relationship between the wholesale and retail rates which is challenged and not the wholesale rate per se. 560 F.2d at 1321. Thus, the anticompetitive effect
was found to be "external" to the federal regulatory process. Id.
" 560 F.2d at 1320 n.7.
" 467 F. Supp. at 769. Despite the Delmarva court's assertion to the contrary, the
Mishawaka court did consider whether antitrust liability would conflict with the federal
regulation of electric power rates. See 560 F.2d at 1321; note 74 supra.
467 F. Supp. at 769.
Id. at 769-70.
T'Id. at 770 (quoting Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251
(1951));_see text accompanying notes 107-118 infra.
" 467 F. Supp. at 771 (citing Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1923)).
In Keogh, a manufacturer sought treble damages for the imposition of freight rates alleged
to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Although the rate in question had been approved by the
ICC after hearings in which the plaintiff had participated, Keogh asserted that he would have
paid a different rate had it not been for the defendants' anticompetitive conduct. 260 U.S.
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junctive relief may be available.' Turning to the state action doctrine, the Delmarva court emphasized that the antitrust laws must
give way when they conflict with "activity authorized by a state in
active pursuit of an established state policy. 812 Since the state in
this case had such a policy regulating electric utilities, and retail
rates took effect pursuant to the policy, antitrust damage relief was
barred."
The Mishawaka and Delmarva courts agreed that the FERC
did not have primary jurisdiction over the price squeeze issue .8
Although the Delmarva court conceded that the FERC's expertise
85
would be helpful in determining whether to grant injunctive relief,
at 162-65. The Keogh Court enumerated three reasons for dismissing the action. First, it noted
that "[a] rate is not necessarily illegal because it is the result of a conspiracy in restraint of
trade. . . ." Id. at 162. Second, it stated that an award of damages would be similar to a
rebate and give the injured party an advantage over other shippers. Id. at 163-64. Third, the
Court stated that the plaintiff's damages were speculative. Id. at 164.
The Delmarva plaintiffs, however, contended that Keogh was distinguishable on three
bases: the Interstate Commerce Act evinced a more pervasive regulatory scheme than the
Federal Power Act, Keogh involved a direct attack on rates and not a rate differential, and
the ICC, unlike the FERC, had power to grant reparations. 467 F. Supp. at 770. The Delmarva
court responded that in both cases an antitrust damage award might conflict with the rates
approved by each commission. Moreover, the court noted, the FERC's lack of authority to
grant reparations to utility customers did not warrant a different result. Id.
11 467 F. Supp. at 768-71. The Delmarva plaintiffs were not seeking an injunction to
prohibit the defendants from charging the rates presently filed with the Commission. Rather,
they sought to enjoin the future initiation of an anticompetitive rate structure. Id. at 768.
Since this would not interfere with either the state or federal regulation of the defendants'
rates, the Delmarva court held that such relief could be granted. Id; see Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 615 n.6 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Posner, The Proper
Relationship Between State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.
693, 728-32 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv.L. REv. 1, 236 (1976); cf. Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (while a damage award would conflict with the
Interstate Commerce Act, injunctive relief would not).
82 467 F. Supp. at 769. The Delmarva court relied on the Supreme Court's observation
in Conway that the FERC's rate-setting power was "expressly limited to jurisdictional sales
to foreclose the possibility that the Commission would seek to correct an alleged discriminatory relationship between wholesale and retail rates by raising or otherwise regulating the
nonjurisdictional, retail price." 426 U.S. at 277. The court stated that Congress did notintend
to impose liability for charging a rate approved by a state commission and "the fact that
plaintiffs' claim is based on two rates, only one of which is within the jurisdiction of the...
[state commission] seems irrelevant." 467 F. Supp. at 769.
3 467 F. Supp. at 769.
" Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1321-24; Delmarva, 467 F. Supp. at 771-72; see notes 125-127
and accompanying text infra.
93 467 F. Supp. at 771. The court did not state that the FERC's expertise would be useful
in determining if the antitrust laws had been violated. Rather, the court opined that the
FERC's expertise would be useful in judging the validity of Delmarva's defenses. Id. at 772.
Delmarva contended that the disparity between wholesale and retail rates was attributable
to the different costs of proViding electricity to wholesale and retail customers, the delays
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it noted the improbability of the FERC considering any evidence of
an alleged prior price squeeze8 and determined that other issues in
the case would not require the Commission's expertise.8 The
Delmarva court, however, left open the possibility of referring issues
to the FERC at a later time if necessary.u In denying a stay, the
Mishawaka court reasoned that the uniformity requirment for the
exercise of primary jurisdiction did not apply because any new rates
the defendants might be required to file would still have to be approved by the Commission."9 The court similarly concluded that the
expertise requirement was not met since the FERC possessed no
expertise in the antitrust field.9
The different conclusions reached by Delmarva and Mishawaka
raise the issue whether the regulation of electric utilities by federal
and state agencies precludes an award of damages when a municipal
utility demonstrates that a price squeeze has caused injury. In an
attempt to resolve this issue, the applicability of the doctrines of
primary and exclusive jurisdiction and the state action exemption
will be examined.
inherent in the rate-setting process, and the varying standards used by the federal and state
commissions in setting rates. Id. at 771.
11Id. at 772. Because of its inability to award reparations or invalidate past rate filings,
the FERC has declined to investigate the past existence of a price squeeze. Northern States
Power Co., FPC DOCKET No. ER 76-818 (May 23, 1977).
81467 F. Supp. at 772. The other issues not requiring the FERC's expertise arose from
the plaintiffs' allegations that defendants had acted to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act. Id.; see note 67 supra.
467 F. Supp. at 772. Although it recognized the potential utility of the FERC's expertise, the Delmarva court allowed discovery to proceed. Id. If discovery were completed prior
to the termination of the rate proceedings, however, the court reasoned that a stay would then
be appropriate. Id.
" 560 F.2d at 1323. The Mishawaka court stated that a grant of injunctive relief would
not interfere with the rates which had already been approved, but would only command the
defendants to end their price squeeze. In this sense, the court noted, the antitrust and
regulatory statutes would complement each other to provide protection from anticompetitive
practices, since the FERC is without power to award reparations and might not be able itself
to remedy the price squeeze. Id.
The court observed that ordering the defendants to file a new rate would not "'starkly
conflict with the explicit statutory mandate of the Federal Power Commission.'" Id. at 132324 (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 395 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
" 560 F.2d at 1324. The court stated that the considerations relevant to a determination
of a just and reasonable rate under the Federal Power Act were different from those that
would be used to determine whether a particular rate comported with the antitrust laws. Id.
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THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY AND EXCLUSIVE JURIS-

DICTION AND THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION TO THE "PRICE SQUEEZE"
ANTITRUST CASE

Exclusive Jurisdiction
The doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction was developed by the
federal courts in response to situations where conduct apparently in
violation of federal law fell within the ambit of a regulatory
scheme." Exclusive jurisdiction immunizes regulated conduct from
antitrust liability if the court finds that Congress, in forging the
regulatory scheme, "intended to override the fundamental national
policies embodied in the antitrust laws."'" When an express exemption is not provided, as in the Federal Power Act, courts may imply
one. Since such "repeals by implication are not favored,' 3 the

courts typically require that a pervasive regulatory scheme be
clearly repugnant to the imposition of liability under the antitrust
laws.9"
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail Power Co. v.
" J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, at § 44A.01(1). The literature and commentary on
the doctrines of primary and exclusive jurisdiction is extensive. For a discussion of these
doctrines, see 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 19.01-19.09 (1958); Petrucelli &
Long, Antitrust and the Regulated Industries: The Role of the "Doctrine" of Primary
Jurisdiction, 1 U. TOL. L. REv. 303 (1969); Pogue, Exclusive Jurisdiction,43 ANTrrRUST L.J.
313 (1974); Shuman, The Applicationof the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries,44 TENN.
L. Rxv. 1, 28-43 (1976); von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction,67 HARv. L. REv. 929 (1954).
32 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973); see,.e.g., Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
11Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18, modified on
othergrounds, 383 U.S. 932 (1966); accordUnited States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 350-51 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
One commentator has argued that
[a] regulatory agency . . . should not make the final determination concerning
antitrust violations. In antitrust policy the relevant factors are so numerous, the
policy choices so complex, and the impact so broad that the ultimate decision
should always rest with a decisionmaker who is without overt institutional bias and
who is in a position to balance the multiplicity of competing interests. The courts
appear better suited for this task. . . . Thus even when an agency is instructed by
statute to consider anticompetitive factors, such a mandate should be viewed only
as providing an additional opportunity for enforcing antitrust policy and not as
depriving the courts of effective jurisdiction.
Shuman, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 44 TENN. L. REV.
1, 42 (1976).
"1 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-75 (1973); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); see United States v. Radio Corp. of
America, 358 U.S. 334, 348-51 (1959) (Interstate Commerce Comm'n); Keogh v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (Interstate Commerce Comm'n).
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United States,95 it is clear that the Federal Power Act does not
provide any per se insulation from the antitrust laws. 6 The defendant in Otter Tail, charged with violating the Sherman Act by
refusing to "wheel" power to municipal power companies,97 maintained that its conduct was exempt from the antitrust laws, because
the Federal Power Act gives the FERC the authority to order interconnections for the purpose of wheeling power.18 The Court, however, found the emphasis of the Act to be on voluntary interconnection. " The Court observed that "Congress had rejected a pervasive
regulatory scheme" in this instance and stated that "[w]hen relationships are governed in the first instance by business judgment
and not regulatory coercion," courts could not infer that the legislative intent was to bypass the federal antitrust laws.'
While Otter Tail dealt with the FERC's authority to order interconnections, it is submitted that the decision is relevant in determining whether a pervasive regulatory scheme exists where price
squeezes are concerned. While filing a rate schedule with the FERC
is mandatory,'"' unlike interconnection which is voluntary, there
appears to be no pervasive regulation of electric power rates.10 The
95410 U.S. 366 (1973).
" Id. at 372.
" Id. at 368. Electric power is "wheeled" when the transmission facilities of one system
are used to transmit the power generated by another system. AMERICAN EwrEwRsE INsTrruTE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE REFORM 2 (1977). The defendant's practices were allegedly designed to prevent the establishment of municipal power companies by
communities which previously were retail franchisees of the defendant. 410 U.S. at 368.
" 410 U.S. at'371-72.
" Id. at 373. The FERC has the power to order interconnection only if a company refuses

to do so voluntarily. Id. In determining whether to order interconnection, the FERC must
consider the best interests of the public; antitrust considerations are not determinative. Id.
It might be argued that the enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824a-825s (1979) will affect future antitrust cases dealing with refusals
to interconnect in light of the Supreme Court's emphasis in Otter Tail that interconnection
is voluntary in the first instance. The amendment provides that the Commission may order
interconnection on its own motion. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 824d (1979)). The Act's legislative
history reveals, however, that the jurisdiction of the courts to hear antitrust cases concerning
interconnection and refusals to wheel was not intended to be abridged. See H.R. REP. 95-1750,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7697.
I' 410 U.S. at 374.
1o 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c) (1976).
oz The Federal Power Act requires only that utilities file their rates with the FERC; each
rate does not have to be approved. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c) (1976). It has been held that the FERC,
under the provisions of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (1976), has pervasive
control over the regulation of rates and hence rates set by the Commission may not be
challenged on antitrust grounds. McLeran v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 357 F. Supp. 329, 33132 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd mer., 491 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1974). The provisions embracing the
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rate schedules are the product of the utilities' business judgment in
the first instance, although some restrictions are contained in Commission guidelines.0 3 A hearing is held to determine whether the
changes are just and reasonable only when there is a challenge by
an intervenor or the Commission. 4 Moreover, the FERC staff participates in the setting of rates only when the hearing reveals the
rates may be outside the zone of reasonableness.' As in Otter Tail,
antitrust considerations must be taken into account in determining
the reasonableness of rates. Anticompetitive factors are not dispositive, however, since the Commission's central concern is in discerning the "public interest."'0 6
Another consideration in determining whether exclusive jurisdiction applies to a price squeeze is the "filed rate" doctrine, because antitrust liability could result in a court ordered rate
change.0 7 The filed rate doctrine, formulated by the Supreme Court
FERC's rate-setting powers are almost identical under the Natural Gas and Federal Power
Acts. Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (1976) with 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (1976). McLeran,
however, appears inapplicable to the price squeeze situation since it dealt with a challenge
to the rate per se.
114See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c) (1976). The FERC has formulated rules governing accounting
methods which must be used in computing rate filings and the form of and information
contained in rate filings. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. §§ 2.16, 2.8 (1979). The FERC also has the power
to reject a rate filing which is patently defective. City of Groton v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1067, 1070
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
10416 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976).
10 Id. § 824e. One commentator has stated:
In substantially every instance, the rates proposed will have been delivered to
the regulatory agency's staff for its comment and criticism before they are officially
filed. If some of the staff's suggestions seem inappropriate, an attempt will be made
to argue them out, usually without a formal hearing, with the regulatory agency
itself. The agency's "green light" is looked upon as a necessary prerequisite to filing.
1 A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 327-28. This indication of a close working relationship, however,
lends support to another commentator's argument that
agencies, because of their parochial concern for a special rather than a general
public interest, currently are institutionally incapable of deciding antitrust issues
effectively. The result is that the role competition plays in regulated and selfregulated industries has become minimized, even obscured. The situation becomes
even more critical to the extent that regulatory agencies develop an affinity for the
regulated industries at the expense of the general public interest.
Shuman, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 44 TENN. L. REv.
1, 69-70 (1976) (footnote omitted).
"I'Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Missouri
Power & Light Co., FERC DoCKET No. ER 76-539 (Oct. 27, 1978), reprintedin 16 Fed. Power
Serv. 5-265, 275. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that although
§ 205 of the Federal Power Act requires the FERC to consider the antitrust laws in regard to
a contract filed as a rate schedule, the FERC can disregard any anticompetitive effects if they
are outweighed by the "public interest" or another proper reason. Northern Cal. Power
Agency v. FPC, 514 F.2d 184, 187-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
I Delmarva, 467 F. Supp. at 770.
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in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service
8 states that a power company may not charge a rate other than
Co., ',
the one filed with the FERC and that a customer has no right to pay
other than the approved rate.' The plaintiff in Montana-Dakota
alleged that the defendant's rates were unreasonable and hence in
violation of the Federal Power Act."0 In dismissing the action, the
Court noted that the rates set by the Commission may be reasonable, but other rates also may be since "reasonableness is an
abstract quality represented by an area rather than a pinpoint.""'
The concern seemed to be that the courts would transgress upon the
FERC's discretion and order rates which they deemed to be more
reasonable than those set by the Commission."' In a price squeeze
situation, however, it is not the wholesale rates per se which are
being challenged but the relationship between the wholesale and
retail rates." 3 Moreover, the Act's central concern is whether rates
are reasonable, just and not unduly discriminatory," 4 whereas the
thrust of an antitrust action is to prevent and afford recompense for
discrimination and anticompetitive effects."' Even if the FERC set
wholesale rates within the lowest boundary of reasonableness, an
anticompetitive effect might persist where retail rates are extremely
low, since the Commission's discretion ends where confiscatory
rates begin." 8
341 U.S. 246 (1951).
Id. at 251. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, stated that if the cause of action
arises under the Federal Power Act, exclusive jurisdiction vests in the Commission. The
Court stressed, however, that a federal action may be brought to enforce the Act, "using the
allegations of fraud to escape the limitations of the Power Commission remedies." Id. at 250.
110Id. at 248. Both parties in Montana-Dakotawere electric utilities engaged in interstate
commerce. In addition to claiming that the defendant's rates were unreasonable, the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant had fraudulently abused the interlocking directorate which had
existed between the parties. Id. at 247. The Court held, however, that the plaintiff could not
"litigate in a judicial forum its general right to a reasonable rate, ignoring the qualification
that it shall be made specific only by exercise of the Commission's judgment." Id. at 251.
Id.; see FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976).
l 341 U.S. at 251. In Montana-Dakota,the Court left the plaintiff remediless by holding
the determination of reasonable rates to be exclusively within the jurisdiction of the FERC.
Id. at 251-53.
13 FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. at 279.
1 16 U.S.C. § 824d (1976).
"5 See note 90 supra.
"' Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1323. The Mishawaka court noted that "severely depressing
wholesale rates" does not necessarily eliminate the price squeeze, since the FERC cannot
set rates below a reasonable level even if it would remedy the price squeeze. Id.The court
concluded, therefore, that antitrust remedies, which would not conflict with the "explicit
statutory mandate of the Federal Power Commission," constitute the only available protection. Id.
"'

log
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Thus, while the filed rate doctrine controls per se challenges to rates
approved by the Commission," 7 it should not be a bootstrap used
to establish exclusive jurisdiction in the FERC when a price squeeze
exists."'
In addition to not providing a pervasive regulatory scheme, the
Federal Power Act does not seem repugnant to the operation of the
antitrust laws. While the considerations relevant to rate-making
under the Federal Power Act may differ from those used to determine a violation of the Sherman Act,"' the prophylactic purposes
of the schemes are the same: to curb discriminatory or anticompetitive business practices. The statutory frameworks, therefore, may
complement each other. 0 Yet, because the FERC cannot provide a
remedy for injury due to the existence of a price squeeze and may
be unable to prevent future occurrences, it is suggested that the sole
effective means of redress available to municipally-owned utilities

is under the antitrust laws.'2 '
Primary Jurisdiction
The administrative law doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which
stays a judicial proceeding, is intended to coordinate the work of the
,, Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 250 (1951);
cf. McLeran v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 357 F. Supp. 329, 331 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd mem.,
491 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1974) (no per se challenge of rates set by FERC under Natural Gas
Act on antitrust grounds).
" Contra, Delmarva, 467 F. Supp. at 765-66.
,, Unlike the cases involving the Interstate Commerce Comm'n, see note 94 supra, the
courts have been reluctant to find exclusive jurisdiction in the FERC. For example, in Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950), the court held that a suit challenging the propriety
of pricing agreements alleged to be violative of the antitrust laws was properly before a federal
court. 184 F.2d at 561. The court reviewed the Federal Power Act and found that the Act's
prohibition against monopolistic combinations in the issuance of licenses "was a reaffirmance
of the Sherman Act and was designed to restrict rather than to enlarge the Commission's
authority." Id. at 561-62.
' See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
,2,
See Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1323.
The FERC in Northern States Power Co., FPC DocKET No. ER 76-818 (May 23, 1977),
conceded that it does not have exclusive jurisdiction over a price squeeze. The Commission
stated that its examination would not conflict with a court's determination since
[t]hat action seeks damages for allegedly anticompetitive activity that occurred
in the past. . . . [An award of damages or injunctive relief] are beyond our jurisdiction as we cannot look to past rate schedules and, if a price squeeze were found,
we could not take any remedial action. Accordingly there is no alternative to this
issue being litigated in both forums, one concerning itself with present rates and
the other with past rates and possible future conduct.
Id., quoted in Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1321.
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courts and administrative agencies and ensure an informed judicial
determination through use of an agency's expertise.'22 The doctrine
will be invoked when a defendant's conduct falls within the ambit
of a regulatory scheme or when an agency's expertise would be helpful to the court in its determination. '2 While both the exclusive and
primary jurisdiction doctrines have been invoked when the antitrust
laws appear to conflict with a regulatory scheme, the exercise of
primary jurisdiction will not result in a determination of all pending
issues. 24
It is suggested that the need for coordination or uniformity
between the courts and administrative agencies does not exist when
a price squeeze is at issue.'2 An injunction requiring an investorowned electric utility to file new rates to eliminate or prevent a price
squeeze would not conflict with the regulatory scheme established
by the Federal Power Act, 21 since a lower rate schedule still would
need Commission approval. 27 Even if the injunction pertained only
to rates charged the complaining party, the FERC, in approving the
rates, could ensure that the new schedule was not unduly discriminatory or preferential to other wholesale customers. 28 An award of
damages for past anticompetitive conduct also does not have to be
coordinated with the FERC, since the Commission does not possess
the authority to invalidate rates retroactively or to award repara'2 Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113, 114 (1973); Ricci v. Chicago
Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 290 (1973); cf. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S.
570, 574 (1952) ("cases raising issues of fact not within conventional experience of judges or
cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion").
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction originated in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41 (1907), to preserve uniformity in regulation. Later, the purpose
was expanded to include the utilization of the specialized knowledge of the regulatory agency.
See, e.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
The Supreme Court has stated that "[n]o fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction." United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956). Rather,
the relevant inquiry is "whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and
whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation."
Id.
12 See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
127 J.VON KAniNOWSKI, supra note 13, at § 44A.03(1); see Miron, PrimaryJurisdiction,

43

ANTrrauST

L.J. 329, 331 (1974).

"I See generally Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1321-24.
In Cf. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (injunction against initiation
of anticompetitive rates not inconsistent with ICC regulation).
2 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1976).
"
See id. §§ 824d(b), (d). Since most utilities file rate schedules for classes of customers,
a filing in compliance with an injunction would probably benefit all wholesale customers.
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2 9 Moreover, adjudication of a price
tions for past unlawful rates."
squeeze controversy demands an analysis of the reasonableness of
retail rates, a matter over which the FERC has no jurisdiction,'3
and therefore, the court's determination would not conflict with
the Commission's.
It is additionally suggested that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should not be invoked because the Commission's expertise
will not materially aid the court in its final resolution of the issues.' 3
Although the Commission enjoys considerable expertise in ascertaining the reasonableness of rates under the Federal Power Act, the
question whether a rate is reasonable under the antitrust laws falls
without the FERC's "expertise."' 3
The assertion of primary jurisdiction also should not be an
exercise in futility.133 The extraordinary delays inherent in the processing of rates by the FERC would burden an aggrieved municipal
system with increased costs and expenses.' 34 Moreover, when the
Commission finally acts, a price squeeze may have existed for so
long that a municipality may no longer be engaged in the business
of selling electric power.'3 5 It is submitted, therefore, that the doc'1 See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra. See also Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). In holding that a shipper seeking redress must seek
reparations primarily with the ICC, the Abilene Court was concerned with the uniformity of
rates. Id. at 441. One analysis of Abilene suggests, however, that uniformity of reparations is
an altogether different proposition from uniformity of rates. "The fact that one shipper
received greater or lesser reparations than another was not tantamont to a preference of the
sort that the [Interstate Commerce] Act was intended to prevent, for it created no real
competitive advantage." Convisser, PrimaryJurisdiction:The Rule and Its Rationalizations,
65 YALE L.J. 315, 322 (1956). It is submitted that this analysis is pertinent in determining
whether the need for uniformity compels the exercise of primary jurisdiction by a court
considering price squeeze allegations. In awarding damages, such a court would not be granting an injured party an unfair advantage. Additionally, if an injunction ordering a new rate
to be filed were phrased so as not to proscribe a particular rate, no unfair advantage would
result.
I" See note 61 and accompanying text supra. Since the FERC cannot exercise jurisdiction over retail rates and hence may not be able to afford a remedy, primary jurisdiction
should not be invoked. Cf. Sunflower Elec. Coop. Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 603 F.2d
791, 799 (10th Cir. 1979) (refusal to wheel should not be referred to FERC since the commission would be unable to afford any relief). See also United States Alkali Export Ass'n v.
United States, 325 U.S. 196, 210 (1945); Slick Airways Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.
Supp. 199, 211-12 (D.N.J. 1951), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953).
13, See Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922).
' See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
' Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1323; see Schwartz, PrimaryAdministrativeJurisdictionand
the Exhaustion of Litigants, 41 GEo. L.J. 495 (1953); cf. Sunflower Elec. Coop. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 603 F.2d 791, 799 (10th Cir. 1979) (refusal to wheel not referable to FERC
when, inter alia, it would be futile).
Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1324. See generally Schwartz, supra note 133.
' Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1325.
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trine of primary jurisdiction should not be applied in most price
squeeze cases. Should the need for the FERC's expertise arise during the action, the court still could order a stay. 3 '
The State Action Exemption
Since retail rates are regulated by state commissions, it is necessary to determine whether the state action exemption doctrine
precludes antitrust liability for the maintenance of a price
squeeze.' 37 The Supreme Court first enunciated the doctrine in
Parker v. Brown, '3 wherein it held that the federal antitrust laws
do not apply to activity undertaken pursuant to a state economic
regulatory scheme.' 39 Although some circuit courts had broadly interpreted the state action exemption to include private parties acting under the auspices of a state regulatory scheme,' several recent
Supreme Court cases have circumscribed the application of the doctrine.
In the first case decided, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,'4' the
Court stated that the "threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was
1' Delmarva, 467 F. Supp. at 772; accord, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
427 F. Supp. 57, 61-62 (D.D.C. 1976).
" The literature and commentary on the state action exemption doctrine is extensive.
For a thorough discussion of this doctrine, see Handler, The CurrentAttack on the Parker v.
Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1976); Jacobs, State Regulationand the
FederalAntitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 221 (1975); Posner, The ProperRelationship
Between State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. lav. 693 (1974).
' 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
, Id. at 368. The Parker plaintiff, a California raisin grower, sought to enjoin enforcement of a state program designed to restrict raisin production in order to stabilize prices,
claiming that the program violated the Sherman Act. Defendants were state officials charged
with administering the program. Id. at 344. A unanimous Court held that the Sherman Act
did not invalidate the program, stating that there is "nothing in the language of the Sherman
Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature." Id. at 350-51. The Court did note, however,
that the program, if undertaken by a private party, would have violated the antitrust laws.
Id. at 350.
110See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438
F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
1' 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, a prospective home buyer successfully argued that
a county bar association's minimum fee schedule which suggested fees for title searches
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 775. The defendants contended that the state
action exemption served to immunize its conduct from antitrust scrutiny since the state bar
association, an agency of the Virginia Supreme Court, had condoned the use of such schedules. Id. at 779. The state bar was authorized to administer regulations adopted by that court,
id. at 776 n.2, and although it did not compel compliance with the schedules, it did advise
that its members adhere to the suggested fees. Id. at 776-78.
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not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the
State acting as sovereign.""' Since this test was designated as a
"threshold inquiry," the Goldfarb decision suggests that factors
other than whether the activity is required by the state must be
taken into account before granting antitrust immunity.' This view
of Goldfarb was confirmed in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,'
wherein the Supreme Court found the state action exemption inapplicable, even though a state regulatory scheme approved the
45
defendant's conduct.
In Cantor, Detroit Edison, an investor-owned electric power
company, furnished free light bulbs to its residential customers
under a tariff filed with and approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission.' Cantor, a retail druggist, sued Detroit Edison,
alleging that the program restrained competition in the light bulb
market and hence violated the antitrust laws.'47 The defendant
claimed it would be unfair to hold it liable under the antitrust laws
for merely obeying an order of the state.' Rejecting this argument,
the Court held that neither the program's approval by the state
regulatory body nor the inability of Detroit Edison to terminate the
program without prior state approval constituted a sufficient basis
for exemption from the antitrust laws. In reaching its conclusion,
the Court noted that although Michigan had a strong interest in
regulating electric utilities, its concern did not extend to the light
bulb industry."' Moreover, since no hearing had been held to determine the impact of the bulb exchange program on competition,
enforcement of the antitrust laws would not really conflict with an
anticompetitive program specifically sanctioned by the state. 5 ' The
12 Id. at 790.

11 Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor
and Bates, 77 CoLUm. L. REv. 898, 901 (1977).
" 428 U.S. 579 (1976).

Id. at 598. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Stevens, is divided into four sections. Sections 11 and IV, which deal with the proper scope of the state action exemption,
were acceded to only by a plurality of the Court.
"' Id. at 583. Although Detroit Edison did not charge its customers separately for the
light bulbs, their cost was included in the retail rates. Id. at 582-83. Through its program,
Detroit Edison supplied almost 50% of the light bulbs most commonly used in residences.
Id.
17 Id. at 581 n.3. Plaintiff alleged violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976), and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). 428 U.S. at 581 n.3.
",

"

428 U.S. at 592.

Id. at 584. Because Detroit Edison's conduct was not required by the regulatory
scheme, Goldfarb's threshold inquiry was not satisfied. See note 147 and accompanying text
supra.
11 428 U.S. at 584-85.
24
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Court also reasoned that, despite Michigan's approval, Detroit Edison played a sufficiently dominant role in instigating and maintaining the program to require the utility to conform to the standards
of the antitrust laws. " Moreover, the Court stressed that the state
action exemption enunciated in Parker was applied to conduct engaged in by a state official, not a private party acting under a state
directive. 5 2 That the anticompetitive conduct must be employed by
the state, and not merely a private person acting with state
"cacquiescence" or approval, was reaffirmed in Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona.'53
"' Id. at 593-95. Prior to Cantor, none of the circuit courts had subjected a utility to
antitrust liability where the utility had acted under a state-sanctioned tariff. See, e.g., Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Lamb
Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001
(1972); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1062 (1972).
152428 U.S. at 591. Justice Stevens stressed the distinction between state action and
private action under the color of state law first enunciated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943):
Unquestionably the term "state action" may be used broadly to encompass
individual action supported to some extent by state law or custom. Such a broad
use of the term . . . is not, however, what Mr. Chief Justice Stone described in his
Parker opinion. He carefully selected language which plainly limited the Court's
holding to official action taken by state officials.
428 U.S. at 590-91 (footnotes omitted); see note 141 supra.
The Court rejected the contention that the procompetitive thrust of the antitrust laws is
inconsistent with the public interest standard of regulatory statutes:
There are at least three reasons why this argument is unacceptable. First,
merely because certain conduct may be subject both to state regulation and to the
federal antitrust laws does not necessarily mean that it must satisfy inconsistent
standards; second, even assuming inconsistency, we could not accept the view that
the federal interest must inevitably be subordinated to the State's; and finally, even
if we were to assume that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to apply to
areas of the economy primarily regulated by a State, that assumption would not
foreclose the enforcement of the antitrust laws in an essentially unregulated area
such as the market for electric light bulbs.
428 U.S. at 595.
In dissent, Justice Stewart responded that the Court's holding "will surely result in the
disruption of the operation of every state-regulated public utility company in the nation and
in the creation of 'the prospect of massive treble damage liabilities' payable ultimately by
the companies' customers." Id. at 615 (Stewart, J. dissenting) (citation omitted).
'- 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977). The Bates defendants, who had violated an Arizona Supreme
Court rule which prohibited advertising by attorneys, claimed that the rule was violative of
the antitrust laws. The Court noted that, while there was no real regulation of the light bulb
industry in Michigan, antitrust liability in Bates would interfere "with a State's traditional
regulation of a profession." Id. at 362. The Court also stressed that while Cantor involved a
private party, Bates involved a government entity. Id. at 361. Lastly, the Court distinguished
the two cases on the basis that there was active regulation by the state in Bates whereas in
Cantor the state merely "acquiesced" in the maintenance of the light bulb program. Id. at
362-63.
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It is submitted that the Supreme Court's recent decisions show
the inapplicability of the state action exemption to the price
squeeze case. As in Cantor, the antitrust claim in a price squeeze
case is directed against a private party-an electric utility.'5 4 A more
difficult question is whether the practice attacked in a price squeeze
case is state-compelled. As in Cantor, it is suggested that it is not.
Initially, it may appear that a utility's rates are compelled by the
state since investor-owned power companies are required to file
their retail rates with state commissions and are prohibited from
charging rates other than those filed. It should be stressed, however,
that the retail rates per se are not being challenged, but the rates'
relation to the wholesale rates and the resulting "synergistic" effect.'55 Since the state commissions have no jurisdiction over the
wholesale rates, they cannot be said to have compelled the maintenance of a price squeeze. Additionally, the Cantor Court emphasized that it must clearly be the state's decision to employ anticompetitive practices. If the private party significantly participates in
the decisionmaking, it is considered to be merely approved by the
state.'5 6 Since utilities exercise business judgment in proposing retail rates and deciding to pancake wholesale rate filings, the anticompetitive practices at most can be described as approved by the
state commissions rather than compelled.'57
Another relevant consideration is whether imposition of antitrust liability would conflict with the state regulatory interest in the
Bates may be distinguished from Goldfarb, see notes 141-143 and accompanying text
supra, on the ground that the Goldfarb minimum fee schedule was formulated by a county
bar association, a private organization, while in Bates the prohibition against attorney advertising was imposed by an agency of the state. 433 U.S. at 359-60. Moreover, the minimum
fee schedule in Goldfarb was merely suggested, whereas the prohibition against attorney
advertising in Bates was absolute.
Another recent case, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978), also involved the state action exemption. City of Lafayette was an antitrust action
brought by a municipally-owned electric utility against an investor utility in which the
defendants counterclaimed that the plaintiff was violating the antitrust laws by tying its
electric power service to its water and gas service. The plaintiff contended that it was immune
from antitrust liability under the state action exemption since it was a subdivision of the
state. The Court rejected the plaintiff's contention declaring that "the Parkerdoctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of the government by the State as
sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." Id. at 413.
Im See Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1314; Delmarva, 467 F. Supp. at 763; City of Shakopee
v. Northern States Power Co., No. 4-75-591 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 1976).
'' See FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
's' 428 U.S. at 593-95.
, See Mishawaka, 560 F.2d at 1320; City of Shakopee v. Northern States Power Co.,
No. 4-75-591, slip op. at 7 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 1976).
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challenged conduct. As previously discussed, the states have a considerable interest in the regulation of electric power rates." 8 The
interest is multifaceted. Aside from attempting to ensure reasonable
and not unduly discriminatory retail rates, state regulatory schemes
were instituted to prevent the abuses that often occur when a state
sanctions a monopoly and to foster the relatively insignificant competition that exists." 9 It appears, therefore, that enforcement of the
antitrust laws complements rather than conflicts with state regulatory interests since both schemes are designed to prevent the abuses
of monopoly and foster competition.
ESTABLISHING THE ANTITRUST VIOLATION

Having shown that neither the state action exemption nor the
doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction should immunize the rate activities of electric utilities from the antitrust laws, the focus shifts to
whether the maintenance of a price squeeze violates section 2 of the
Sherman Act."" Section 2 prohibits actual monopolization, atSee note 6 and accompanying text supra.
See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 595-96. The Cantor Court stated:
[A]ll economic regulation does not necessarily suppress competition. On the contrary, public utility regulation typically assumes that the private firm is a natural
monopoly and that public controls are necessary to protect the consumer from
exploitation. There is no logical inconsistency between requiring such a firm to
meet regulatory criteria insofar as it is exercising its natural monopoly powers and
also to comply with antitrust standards to the extent that it engages in business
activity in competitive areas of the economy.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). In addition to the retail competition previously
discussed, see note 7 and accompanying text supra, public utilities also engage in what is
known as "yardstick" competition. "This term is meant to identify the competitive pressure
felt by a utility as a consequence of lower rates or superior service of a neighboring utility
even when the two systems are legally or practically prevented from competing for customers." Fairman & Scott, supra note 7, at 1162 & n.18 (1977).
11015 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). In addition to alleging a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act,
the Delmarva plaintiffs brought an action under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). 467 F. Supp. at 772. The Robinson-Patman Act provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale . . . and where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination or with customers of either of them.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
The Delmarvadefendants argued that the claim should be dismissed because electricity
"

"'
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tempts to monopolize, and combining or conspiring to monopolize. ' Thus, the mere existence of a monopoly is not proscribed.
2
Rather, acts or attempted acts of monopolization are prohibited.
To prove monopolization, it must be established that a defendant
has monopoly power 1 3 and the intent to exclude competition
through the exercise of that power." 4
was not a "commodity" within the meaning of the Act. Unable to discover case law to aid in
the resolution of this issue, the court examined the Act's legislative history and concluded
that electricity is not a commodity within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. 467 F.
Supp. at 773-74. It is submitted, however, that electric power comes within the definition of
commodity. It has been stated that "the most reliable guide to the meaning of the word
'commodity' is the context in which it is employed," namely "goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery and supplies.

. .

."

Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,

295 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1962). Thus, excluded from the
scope of "commodities" have been such things as space on a telephone pole, T V Signal Co.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1972), news information, Tri-State
Broadcasting Co. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 369 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1966), newspaper advertising space, Natonal Tire Wholesale, Inc. v. Washington Post Co., 441 F. Supp. 81 (D.D.C.
1977), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1979), money in the form of a loan, Wendkos v.
ABC Consol. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1974), an admission ticket, Kennedy Theater
Ticket Serv. v. Ticketron Inc., 342 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a lease, Plum Tree, Inc. v.
N. K. Winston Corp., 351 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a patent license agreement, La Salle
St. Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1968), modified,
445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971), and real estate, Gaylord Shops Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile
Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
Although sales of services and intangibles are not included within the meaning of
"commodities" under the Robinson-Patman Act, see Baum v. Investors Diversified Servs.,
Inc., 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969); F. RowE, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSONPATmAN AcT 59 (1962), it is submitted that electricity is neither a service nor an intangible
since it can be produced, stored, measured, bought and sold. Finally, the Supreme Court,
although perhaps inadvertantly, has referred to electricity as a commodity. See MontanaDakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951).
" 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); see note 67, supra.
IS? Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); see E. KINTNER, AN ANTrRUST PRIMER
101 (1973); 1 J. VON KALiNOWSKi, supra note 13, 7.01[1], at 7-4, 7-5 (1979); cf. United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (unlawful conduct distinguished from achievement of monopoly power by "superior product, business acumen, or historic accident"); Buck
v. Kuykendall, 295 F. 197, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1923), rev'd on othergrounds, 267 U.S. 307 (1925)
(monopoly power achieved by grant of a public franchise not in violation of "law or public
policy").
10 Monopoly power generally is defined as the power to either control prices or exclude
or control competition. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 391 (1956); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1966),
rev'd on othergrounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); Gold Fuel Serv., Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
195 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.N.J. 1961), affl'd, 306 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
951 (1963).
" United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
For a discussion of monopolization, see E. KnNwER, supra note 162, at 101; 1 J. VON KAMJNOWSKI, supra note 13,
7.01[1].
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In determining whether monopoly power exists, two factors
must be examined: the relevant market'65 and the degree of control
over the market.' 6 Investor-owned electric utilities usually possess
monopoly power over the sale of electricity at wholesale and retail
within the areas in which they conduct business.' 7 Thus, liability
'" See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956). A
determination of the relevant market demands two distinct inquiries-the relevant product
market and the relevant geographic market. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563
(1966).
With respect to determining the product market, the Supreme Court has stated:
The 'market' which one must study to determine when a producer has monopoly power will vary with the part of commerce under consideration. The tests are
constant. That market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purpose for which they are produced-price, use and qualities considered.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). It is submitted
that upon applying the test for determining relevant product market as enunciated by the
Supreme Court in du Pont and later cases, see, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); International Boxing Club
Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959), to the price squeeze antitrust action, the relevant
product market is electric power.
The relevant geographic market in which a company does business may be national, see,
e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), regional, see, e.g., United States
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), a state, see, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), or a subdividion of the state, see, e.g.,
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). In price squeeze cases, it appears
that the relevant geographical market generally will be a state or a subdivision of a state,
although the exact geographical market will vary in each case. For example, in Mishawaka
the relevant georgraphic market was found to be the "clearly defined service area in Indiana
and Michigan within which it sells electric power and energy at retail pursuant to franchises
granted by the municipalities and townships." City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power
Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
"I United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956). The degree
of market power necessary to establish monopoly power will vary from case to case. United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1948). Certain percentages, however,
serve as guidelines. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945),
Judge Learned Hand stated that a market share of "[over ninety percent] is enough to
constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough;
and thirty-three percent is not." 148 F.2d at 424.
,67Due to the expense of constructing generation and transmission facilities, there is
rarely more than one utility which has such capacity in one area. See Meeks, supra note 5,
at 64, 68-69 (1972). As of 1968, 76% of the generating capacity in the United States was
controlled by investor-owned utilities. FPC, 1969 STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELEC-mc
UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

(1970). The district court in Mishawaka found that the

defendant possessed monopoly power in the wholesale and retail markets by supplying 95100% and 89% of the power in the markets, respectively. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec.
Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1325-26 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
It has been suggested that market share data should not be the measure of monopoly
power in regulated industries. See Watson & Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated
"Monopolies": The Search for Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BuLL. 559, 566-67 (1977).
Rather, a determination of market share "should ultimately focus directly upon the ability
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may be premised upon the theory that the investor-owned utility is
using its monopoly power on the wholesale level or on both levels to
exclude competition on the retail level. 68
Although intent is a necessary element in proving a violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act, specific intent to eliminate competition need not be shown when the defendant undertakes anticompetitive conduct. 69 A general intent by one possessing monopoly power may be inferred from acts which are prone to have anti-

competitive consequences although the acts would be lawful in the
absence of monopoly power.17 Since the maintenance of a price
squeeze tends to foreclose competition, 7 1 intent may be inferred
from a defendant's failure to attempt to retain parity between
wholesale and retail rates. 7 '
The Clayton Act authorizes a private antitrust plaintiff to seek
treble damages and injunctive relief for violations of the antitrust
laws. 73 In seeking damages, the exact amount of injury sustained by
a plaintiff need not be shown. Rather, only a reasonable estimate
must be ascertainable.7 4 It is submitted that the only reasonable
of the regulated monopoly to control prices or exclude competition." Id. at 567-68. It is submitted that even if this analysis were used, monopoly power on the part of investor-owned
utilities would be found. First, because of their ability to pancake rates with the FERC,
investor utilities can, in effect, control the price to be charged for wholesale electric power.
Second, investor-owned utilities have the power to exclude retail competition since they
generally control the generation facilities on which municipal utilities depend.
I" See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973); Meeks, supra
note 5, at 118-19; cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (firm may not use
monopoly power at one level to extend its control to other levels by prohibiting competitors
from using a facility over which it has control); International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (use of patent to extend the holder's monopoly power to
other services in violation of § 3 of Clayton Act). See also Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341 (1963).
" United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948). Anticompetitive actions are
"kinds of acts which would be lawful in the absence of monopoly but, because of their
tendency to foreclose competitors from access to markets or customers or some other inherently anticompetitive tendency, are unlawful under § 2 if done by a monopolist." SargentWelch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 711.12 (7th Cir.), aff'd mem., 570 F.2d
347 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
,7 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948).
'
See City of Shakopee v. Northern States Power Co., No. 4-75-591, slip op. at 2 (D.
Minn. Oct. 18, 1976).
I" See generally Meeks, supra note 5, at 118-19. It is submitted that intent should not
be inferred from the mere existence of a price squeeze since a disparity between wholesale
and retail rates may result from the dual regulatory process. Rather, intent should be inferred
from an investor-owned utility's failure to make a good faith effort to achieve parity.
"
15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976).
'
E.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) (citing Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
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estimate of damages sustained due to the maintenance of a price
squeeze is the difference between the investor-owned utility's wholesale and retail rates. Although the "reasonable" rate that a
municipally-owned utility should be charged may be at a higher
level than the retail rates, the difference between this "reasonable"
wholesale rate and the wholesale rate actually paid is not the
amount of damages sustained. The real injury sustained in a price
squeeze situation is the loss of customers, revenue and competitive
position. 17 5 The most effective means of remedying this injury would

be to award damages equal to the difference between wholesale and
retail rates so that the municipal power company could lower its
retail rates and recoup some of its lost business, thus providing
redress for the past discriminatory overcharge.' 5
RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

A recent legislative proposal advanced by Senators Kennedy
and Hatch promises to have favorable effects on the resolution of
the price squeeze problem. 77' Entitled the Competition Improvements Act of 1979, the bill would increase the extent to which regulatory agencies must consider anticompetitive effects in reaching
Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927)). The Bigelow Court explained the damage
principle as follows:
the jury may not render a verdict based on speculation or guesswork. But the jury
may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data,
and render its verdict accordingly. In such circumstances "juries are allowed to act
upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and positive proof."
327 U.S. at 264 (citations omitted).
,75See City of Shakopee v. Northern States Power Co., No. 4-75-591, slip op. at 2 (D.
Minn. Oct. 18, 1976).
,' See City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1341 (N.D.
Ind. 1979). The effect of awarding damages in an amount representing the difference between
wholesale and retail rates would be to treat the wholesale customers as if they had bought at
retail.
Although a successfully prosecuted action would result in an award of treble damages,
other considerations might make it desirable to assess actual damages. It is in the public
interest that electric power rates be kept low, since electricity is a necessity. A judgment for
treble damages, however, may prompt the offending power company to file for an increase in
rates in order to recoup some of its lost profits. See also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 615 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Furthermore, an award of treble damages may
increase a utility's capital costs which are used to determine revenue requirements. STATE
GOVERNMENTS' REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. An increase in capital costs may entitle the utility
to a higher rate but this would be discretionary with the FERC due to the reason for the
increased costs. Since the antitrust laws only provide for treble damages, legislation would
be needed to allow a court to assess actual damages.
,7 Competition Improvements Act of 1979, S. 382, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc.
1272 (1979).
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their determinations. 78 Regulatory agencies would have to apply an
antitrust standard unless three criteria were satisfied. The proposed
action must be necessary to achieve the agency's statutory goal,
must clearly outweigh any detrimental effect to competition, and
must have the least anticompetitive impact of any alternative
course.'7 9 The bill also provides that if a party appeals, the regulatory agency bears the burden of proving that it has satisfied the
criteria. ' 0

It is submitted that passage of the Competition Improvements
Act together with the Conway decision, which requires the FERC
to consider retail rates, and any actions taken pursuant to a study
8

recently authorized by the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act' '

effectively would prohibit the FERC from allowing a price squeeze
to exist.' 2 The study seems to contemplate a reduction in the delays
encountered in receiving rate filing determinations and a prohibition of pancaking rate filings.1s Although antitrust remedies should
still be available to an injured party, these measures would help
prevent the problem initially and thus eliminate the possibility of
a wholesale customer being forced to discontinue its business prior
to receiving relief.

I's
Id. §

3(a).

179Id.
193Id.

"I Pub. L. No. 95-617, 95 Stat. 3117 (1978). Finding the need for a program to improve
the regulation of sales of electric power at the wholesale level, id. § 2, Congress included a
provision instructing the chairman of the FERC to conduct an investigation into the procedures used in determining the lawfulness of proposed wholesale rate increases. Id. § 207. The
purpose of the study is threefold. First, the chairman must consider ways to eliminate the
long delays in determining the reasonableness of proposed rates. A second objective is to
generate proposals to prevent the pancaking of rates. Finally, the chairman has been directed
to develop procedures to ensure that price squeezes do not come into existence. Id.
Although manifesting a desire on the part of Congress to curb abuses of the regulatory
process, the investigation provision is substantially weaker than that originally passed by the
House of Representatives. See H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The House version
required the FERC to reach a decision on proposed rates within ten months after filing, id. §
543(a), and prohibited the pancaking of rates. Id. § 543(b). Moreover, the proposal expanded
the definition of a reasonable rate to include that the rate be otherwise lawful; a rate creating
or maintaining an anticompetitive price squeeze would be unlawful. Id. § 543(a). The House
bill also granted the FERC the power to reject a rate filing in order to prevent unfair trade
practices. Id. Thus, the House measure could have protected wholesale customers from the
establishment of a price squeeze. Radin, Outlook and Insights, Improving FPC Regulation,
1976 Pus. POWER 8-9 (May-June 1976).
182See note 181 supra.
"1 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 95 Stat. 3117, §
207 (1978). See also Radin, Outlook and Insights, Improving FPC Regulation, 1976 PUB.
POWER 8-9 (May-June 1976).
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CONCLUSION

Competition in the electric power industry is a desirable goal,
yet the nature of the industry often necessitates the existence of a
monopoly in a particular geographic area. An electric utility with
monopoly power, however, should not be allowed to use its position
to exclude the minimal competition that does exist. Imposition of
antitrust liability for the creation or perpetuation of a price squeeze
should help further the national goal of maintaining competitive
conditions in the marketplace.
In applying the requisite tests for establishing the applicability
of exclusive jurisdiction and the state action exemption, it has been
suggested that neither doctrine immunizes an investor-owned utility from antitrust liability for the creation or perpetuation of a price
squeeze. Moreover, since the antitrust action to remedy a price
squeeze is a challenge to neither the wholesale rate per se nor the
retail rate per se but rather to the "synergistic" effect that results
from the dual regulation of electric rates, the application of antitrust damage remedies would not interfere with either state or federal regulation.
It also has been suggested that the maintenance of wholesale
rates in excess of retail rates is a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, for which a plaintiff may be awarded both monetary and
injunctive relief.
Antitrust liability, however, is by itself insufficient. Legislation
in this area not only is desirable but necessary to change the policies, and prevent the practices, which allow price squeezes to exist.
Michele Gapinski

